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THE SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECTS OF 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE: A META-ANALYSIS 
 
JOEL H. GARNER, CHRISTOPHER D. MAXWELL & JINA 
LEE* 
A dozen systematic reviews published since 1978 have sought to clarify 
the complexities of deterrence theory. These reviews emphasize the general 
deterrent effects of police presence, arrest, and incarceration on rates of 
homicide and other serious crimes, such as assault, rape, and burglary. 
These reviews provide less attention to specific deterrence processes and to 
the deterrent impacts of intermediate sanctions, such as prosecution or 
conviction; none of these reviews incorporate any of the research on criminal 
sanctions for intimate partner violence. To address these limitations, this 
research uses meta-analytic methods to assess the specific deterrent effects 
of three post-arrest criminal sanctions—prosecution, conviction, and 
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incarceration—for one offense type—intimate partner violence. Based upon 
57 studies that reported 237 tests of specific deterrence theory, the effects of 
sanctions varied: there is a marginal deterrent effect for prosecution, no 
effect for conviction, and a large escalation effect among incarcerated 
offenders. In addition, deterrent effects in the available research are stronger 
in tests that use more rigorous research designs, that measure repeat 
offending using victim interviews instead of official records, and that use new 
offenses against the same victim—not new arrests or new convictions against 
any victim—as the criteria for repeat offending. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 228 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................. 231 
A. Reviews of Deterrence Research ...................................... 231 
B. Limitations in Deterrence Reviews ................................... 234 
C. Deterrent Effects of Arrest ................................................ 235 
D. Deterrent Effects of Post-Arrest Sanctions ....................... 238 
II. DESIGN OF THIS RESEARCH ................................................. 241 
A. Meta-Analytic Methods .................................................... 241 
B. Scope of This Research ..................................................... 242 
1. Studies Identified ........................................................ 244 
2. Multiple Tests within Studies ..................................... 248 
C. Using the "Best" Test Method ........................................... 249 
D. Alternative Approaches to Addressing Independence ...... 252 
III. FINDINGS .................................................................................. 254 
A. Best Effects ....................................................................... 254 
B. Study Design Moderators of Deterrent Effects ................. 262 
IV. DISCUSSION ............................................................................. 265 
V. APPENDICES ............................................................................. 268 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between criminal sanctions and criminal behavior is an 
enduring theme throughout classical and contemporary criminological 
thought.1 Lawrence Sherman goes so far as to assert that the “conceptual core 
 
 1 See, e.g., Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. 
L. REV. 949 (1966); CESARE BONESANA DI BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 
(Albany, NY, W.C. Little & Co. 1872); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (New Ed., Clarendon Press 1907) (1780); NAT’L 
RSCH. COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL 
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of criminology is the science of sanction effects . . . .”2 Scholars have 
interpreted the relationship between the application of criminal sanctions and 
subsequent criminal offending in terms of labeling theory,3 re-integrative 
shaming,4 victim empowerment,5 and defiance.6 Much of the contemporary 
scholarly literature on criminal sanctions, like much of the current policy 
attention, focuses on deterrence theory—the argument that potential 
offenders are dissuaded from future criminality by the threat of future 
penalties that are appropriately swift, certain, and severe.7 
The deterrence framework, articulated by Cesare Beccaria as part of an 
effort to reduce the severity of the then-common penalties of execution, 
torture, and lengthy incarceration,8 is employed in the contemporary 
American context to support the use of capital punishment;9 longer prison 
sentences;10 mandatory prison terms for using a firearm in the commission 
of a felony;11 the threat of more severe sanctions for youth violence and drug 
sales;12 prosecution for tax evasion;13 increases in the number of sworn police 
 
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel Nagin, eds., 
1978); GERHARD O. W. MUELLER, SENTENCING: PROCESS AND PURPOSE § 12 (1977); Jack P. 
Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 SW. SOC. SCI. Q. 515 (1968); Daniel S. Nagin, 
Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199 (2013). 
 2 Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the 
Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 446 (1993) (emphasis omitted). 
 3 See David P. Farrington & Joseph Murray, Empirical Tests of Labeling Theory in 
Criminology, in 18 LABELING THEORY: EMPIRICAL TESTS 1, 1–9 (David P. Farrington & Joseph 
Murray eds., 2014) (describing the history of testing labeling theory). 
 4 See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989) 
(presenting the seminal articulation of the logic and effects of reintegrative shaming). 
 5 See generally Lauren Bennett Cattaneo & Lisa A. Goodman, What is Empowerment 
Anyway? A Model for Domestic Violence Practice, Research, and Evaluation, 5 PSYCH. 
VIOLENCE 84 (2015) (identifying a common empowerment framework for researchers and 
practitioners). 
 6 See Sherman, supra note 2, at 459–66. 
 7 E.g., JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1975); FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973) 
(explicating the elements of deterrence theory). 
 8 See BECCARIA, supra note 1, at 93–111. 
 9 See Issac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and 
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975) (providing an early economic analysis of the benefits 
of capital punishment). 
 10 Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish 
Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & ECON. 343, 346–50 (1999). 
 11 ATT’Y GEN.’S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT, 30–32 (1981). 
 12 See DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE 
PROSPECT OF SANCTION 142–65 (Peter Reuter & Ernesto U. Savona eds., 2009). 
 13 Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of 
Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 209, 238–39 (1989). 
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officers;14 police foot patrols;15 hot-spots policing;16 stop-and-frisk police 
tactics;17 arrest for juvenile offenders;18 arrest of prostitution clients;19 and 
arrest,20 prosecution,21 conviction,22 and incarceration23 for intimate partner 
violence. 
Amidst the violent upheavals of the English Civil War, Thomas Hobbes 
asserted that the state’s use of criminal sanctions was necessary to preserve 
the commonwealth, without which life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.”24 A century later in Italy, Cesare Beccaria argued that, 
while criminal sanctions are necessary, authorities should constrain their use 
because “[t]he end of punishment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the 
criminal from doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from 
committing the like offence.”25 Beccaria’s twin goals for punishment provide 
the groundwork for modern distinctions between specific deterrence—to 
influence the sanctioned offender—and general deterrence—to influence the 
behavior of others. General deterrent effects of sanctions are seen as having 
an indirect impact on the behavior of individuals whether or not they have 
 
 14 Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of 
Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 286 (1997). 
 15 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Travis Taniguchi, Elizabeth R. Groff & Jennifer D. Wood, The 
Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Police Patrol 
Effectiveness in Violent Crime Hotspots, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 795, 818 (2011). 
 16 Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos & David M. Hureau, The Effects of Hot 
Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 
655–56 (2014). 
 17 See David Weisburd, Alese Wooditch, Sarit Weisburd & Sue-Ming Yang, Do Stop, 
Question, and Frisk Practices Deter Crime?, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31, 46–47 
(2016). 
 18 See Douglas A. Smith & Patrick R. Gartin, Specifying Specific Deterrence: The 
Influence of Arrest on Future Criminal Activity, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 94, 102–03 (1989). 
 19 See Devon. D. Brewer, John J. Potterat, Stephen Q. Muth & John M. Roberts, Jr., A 
Large Specific Deterrent Effect of Arrest for Patronizing a Prostitute, 1 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 
(2006). 
 20 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest 
for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261, 268–70 (1984). 
 21 BARBARA J. HART & ANDREW R. KLINE, PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT 
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE RESEARCH FOR VICTIM ADVOCATES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 
156–59 (2013). 
 22 Edna Erez, Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview, 7 ONLINE 
J. ISSUES NURSING 4, 7–8 (2002), http://ojin.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANA
Marketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Volume72002/No1Jan2002/Domestic
ViolenceandCriminalJustice.html [https://perma.cc/633P-KKL5]. 
 23 Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1542–44 (1997). 
 24 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 78 (Rod Hay ed., McMaster Univ. 1999) (1651). 
 25 BECCARIA, supra note 1, at 47. 
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previously committed an offense or whether they have been sanctioned or 
not. Specific deterrent effects of sanctions have traditionally been seen as 
more direct and as only affecting offenders who have been sanctioned.26 
However, our understanding of specific deterrence has been broadened to 
consider the extent to which avoiding sanctions increases future offending as 
well as whether being sanctioned reduces future offending.27 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. REVIEWS OF DETERRENCE RESEARCH 
The extensive body of research that invokes deterrence theory to 
interpret the empirical relationships between criminal sanctions and 
offending has generated a dozen detailed reviews since 1978.28 These 
reviews assess a large and diverse body of research that includes a variety of 
empirically tested hypotheses about whether, to what extent, and in what 
direction various aspects of contemporary criminal sanctions affect any or all 
aspects of subsequent criminal behavior.29 While none of these reviews 
capture all the composite parts of deterrence theory, they are part of a vibrant, 
contemporary enthusiasm to clarify the complexities of deterrence theory and 
 
 26 Johannes Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 76, 78–79 (1968). 
 27 Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and Specific 
Deterrence, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 123, 127–29 (1993). 
 28 See Robert Apel, Sanctions, Perceptions, and Crime: Implications for Criminal 
Deterrence, 29 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 67, 93 (2013); Robert Apel & Daniel S. Nagin, 
General Deterrence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179, 179–
206 (Michael Tonry, ed., 2011); Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A 
Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 5–6 (2017); Philip J. Cook, Research in 
Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade, in 2 CRIME & JUST. 
211, 211–268 (1980); Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can 
Both Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 13–54 (2011); Daniel S. Nagin, 
Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 
1, 1–42 (1998) [hereinafter Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research]; Daniel S. Nagin, General 
Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES, supra note 1, at 95–139 
[hereinafter Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence]; Daniel S. 
Nagin, Robert M. Solow & Cynthia Lum, Deterrence, Criminal Opportunities, and Police, 53 
CRIMINOLOGY 74, 74–100 (2015); Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived 
Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173 
(1987); Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, (2010) [hereinafter Paternoster, How Much Do We 
Really Know]; Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and 
Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 415–17, 427–28 (2005); Kirk. R. 
Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical 
Review, 20 L. & SOC’Y REV. 545, 545–572 (1986). 
 29 See supra note 28. 
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to determine the conditions under which deterrent effects can and cannot be 
found. One consistent theme in these reviews is that detecting the existence 
and estimating the size of deterrent effects is difficult and that every approach 
to studying deterrence effects has inconsistent findings, and methodological 
and measurement limitations.30 
Research on general deterrence has long relied on research designs that 
use official records of actual sanctions to compare the annual number of 
arrests, police officers, prison populations, or executions with data on offense 
types, such as homicide, assault, rape, robbery, and burglary, captured in the 
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program.31 In this macro-level research 
approach, the number of individual-level sanctions and offenses are 
aggregated to the level of cities, counties, standard metropolitan statistical 
areas, or states, and compared between jurisdictions and over time. The 
recognition of measurement errors in the available data and the inability to 
resolve disputes over the appropriate identification criteria in macro-level 
statistical models encouraged evaluators of deterrence theory to study the 
effects of variation in official sanctions in single locations over time,32 
between treatment and control locations in a particular jurisdiction,33 among 
different individuals in a particular jurisdiction,34 or for the same individuals 
over time.35 In the 1970s, Franklin Zimring recommended the use of targeted 
policy interventions such as clinical trials, longitudinal surveys, matching, 
propensity scoring, quasi-experiments, bivariate and multivariate analyses, 
comparisons of nonequivalent treatment and control groups, and even 
qualitative studies as valuable approaches for testing deterrence theory.36 
Subsequently, evaluations of policy interventions became a major 
 
 30 See id. 
 31 Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, supra note 28, at 99–
111. 
 32 See, e.g., Lan Shi, The Limit of Oversight in Policing: Evidence from the 2001 
Cincinnati Riot, 93 J . PUB. ECON. 99 (2009). 
 33 See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman & David Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of 
Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995). 
 34 See, e.g., John D. Wooldredge & Amy Thistlethwaite, Reconsidering Domestic 
Violence Recidivism: Conditioned Effects of Legal Controls by Individual and Aggregate 
Levels of Stake in Conformity, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 45 (2002). 
 35 See, e.g., Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Wife Assault, Costs of Arrest, and the 
Deterrence Process, 29 J. RSCH. & CRIME DELINQ. 292 (1992). 
 36 Franklin E. Zimring, Policy Experiments in General Deterrence: 1970–75, in 
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON 
CRIME RATES supra note 1, at 140, 140–86. 
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component of the contemporary literature on deterrence theory.37 While 
macro-level analyses comparing crime rates between jurisdictions are limited 
to the study of general deterrence, focused policy interventions can test either 
general deterrence or specific deterrence, depending primarily on whether 
the link between sanctions and subsequent offending is analyzed at the 
individual level or at one or more aggregate levels. Focused policy 
interventions typically are limited to one or two jurisdictions and this 
weakens their ability to generalize study findings to other jurisdictions 
without independent replications in numerous and diverse locations.38 
Although there are additional methodological considerations in the study of 
focused policy interventions, Daniel Nagin’s assessment is that “well-
conducted experimental and quasi-experimental studies of deterrence 
provide the most convincing evidence of the circumstances under which 
deterrence is and is not effective.”39 
In addition to macro-level studies and evaluations of focused policy 
interventions, existing reviews of deterrence research include a substantial 
body of research that does not rely on the objective properties of punishment 
(measured by official records) but more directly assesses the role that 
perceptions of criminal sanctions play in potential offenders’ decision-
making process (measured primarily through in-depth interviews with 
potential offenders).40 Just as the macro-level comparisons of sanction 
policies cannot assess the specific deterrent impact of official sanctions on 
individuals, evaluations of focused policy interventions based only on 
official records of sanctions cannot determine how potential offenders make 
decisions. They can, however, determine whether the association between 
sanctions and subsequent behavior is or is not in the direction predicted by 
deterrence theory. While there is general agreement on the importance of 
understanding the link between official sanctioning behavior and the 
perceptions of potential offenders about those sanctions, researchers disagree 
sharply41 about the extent to which changes in the likelihood or severity of 
 
 37 Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, The Deterrent Effects of Imprisonment, 43, 48 in 
CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS (Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Justin 
McCrary eds., 2011); Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research, supra note 28, at 4. 
 38 William Alex Pridemore, Matthew C. Makel & Jonathan A. Plucker, Replication in 
Criminology and the Social Sciences, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 19, 21–24 (2018). 
 39 Nagin, supra note 1, at 215–16. 
 40 Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know, supra note 28, at 780–86. 
 41 Compare Nagin, Solow & Lum, supra note 28, at 95 (“We are optimistic that creative 
interviewing techniques can be devised to identify how police tactics influence offender 
perceptions of apprehension risk.”), with Justin T. Pickett & Sean Patrick Roche, Arrested 
Development: Misguided Directions in Deterrence Theory and Policy, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & 
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official sanctions are accurately perceived by potential offenders as well as 
the importance of these perceptions, accurate or not, in offender decision-
making. Research on offender decision-making, embedded within rational 
choice theory, includes factors other than criminal sanctions that might better 
explain the circumstances under which individuals will and will not get 
involved in one or more types of criminal behavior.42 Those factors may vary 
by an individual’s personality traits and do not need to be rational 
assessments of the potential gain or loss involved in offending.43 Moreover, 
these factors could include emotions and other irrational considerations that 
might be especially relevant to understanding violence between intimate 
partners.44 Research from the rational choice perspective can also incorporate 
recent advances in behavioral economics that emphasize the use of heuristics 
and other mental shortcuts in a wide range of human decision-making.45 The 
broader scope of explanatory factors considered within the rational choice 
perspective will likely enhance our understanding of the relative impact of 
sanctions in offender decision-making. However, none of the existing studies 
assessing the impact of prosecution, conviction, or imprisonment on intimate 
partner violence have collected this type of information from potential 
offenders. For this reason, our current understanding of the impact of post-
arrest sanctions on intimate partner violence is derived from analyses on 
focused policy interventions. 
B. LIMITATIONS IN DETERRENCE REVIEWS 
The existing reviews of deterrence research have two substantial 
limitations. First, they focus almost exclusively on the use of arrest or 
imprisonment and ignore the possible impact of intermediate level sanctions. 
Steven Durlauf and Daniel Nagin’s review of deterrence research argues that 
in future tests of deterrence theory, the magnitude of deterrent effects will 
depend critically on the specific form of the sanction policy being studied. 
 
PUB. POL’Y 727, 729 (2016) (“All prior studies examining the correlation between objective 
and perceived arrest risk have yielded null results.”). 
 42 See Thomas A Loughran, Raymond Paternoster & Alex R. Piquero, Individual 
Difference and Deterrence, in DETERRENCE, CHOICE, AND CRIME 211, 215–19 (Daniel S. 
Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson eds., 2018). 
 43 Justin T. Pickett & Shawn D. Bushway, Dispositional Sources of Sanction Perceptions: 
Emotionality, Cognitive Style, Intolerance of Ambiguity, and Self-Efficacy, 39 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 624, 624 (2015). 
 44 Jean-Louis van Gelder & Reinout E. de Vries, Rational Misbehavior? Evaluating an 
Integrated Dual-Process Model of Criminal Decision Making, 30 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4–5 (2014). 
 45 See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (demonstrating 
dual-track decisionmaking processes in a wide range of circumstances). 
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Using an analogy from medicine, they argue that just as specific drugs are 
evaluated based on their effectiveness at treating particular ailments, it would 
be of great value if future research paid more attention to evaluations of the 
effects of distinct types of sanctions on specific types of crimes.46 The second 
limitation in the existing reviews of deterrence research is that none of them 
consider the use of criminal sanctions for violent offenses against an intimate 
partner, nor do they provide a rationale for excluding this substantial body of 
research. 
The purpose of this article is to address both of these limitations. First, 
it provides a concise, qualitative review of the large number of existing 
studies on the specific deterrent effects of arrest for intimate partner violence. 
Second, it provides three systematic, quantitative meta-analyses of the 
existing research on the specific deterrent effects of prosecuting, convicting, 
and incarcerating intimate partner violence offenders. 
C. DETERRENT EFFECTS OF ARREST 
There is a large body of research that has addressed the specific 
deterrent effects of arrest for intimate partner violence. The seminal study in 
this area is a field experiment conducted in Minneapolis which randomly 
assigned intimate partner violence offenders to one of three treatment groups: 
an arrest, on-scene counseling, or physical separation. In the Minneapolis 
experiment, the prevalence of re-offending by arrested offenders was about 
half the rate of re-offending for offenders not arrested.47 The results of the 
Minneapolis experiment received extensive media attention and contributed 
to the widespread adoption of policies that encouraged the use of arrest for 
intimate partner violence.48 The visibility and impact of the Minneapolis 
experiment led to a coordinated program of five new experiments designed 
as close but not exact replications of the Minneapolis experiment. The results 
of these five experiments were published independently and the extent of 
their support for specific deterrent effects of arrest varied by the source of 
data on re-offending, by measures of re-offending, and by jurisdiction.49 
 
 46 Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 37, at 85–86. 
 47 Sherman & Berk, supra note 20, at 267–68. 
 48 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 94–99 (2003). 
 49 ANTHONY PATE, EDWIN E. HAMILTON & SAMPSON ANNAN, METRO-DADE SPOUSE 
ABUSE REPLICATION PROJECT: DRAFT FINAL REPORT 621–66  (1991) (showing deterrent effects 
from both official records and victim interviews but only the effects from victim interviews 
were statistically significant); Richard A. Berk, Alec Campbell, Ruth Klap & Bruce Western, 
A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
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None of the reported findings from these five studies found deterrent 
effects as strong as those reported for the Minneapolis study; however, 
several efforts to systematically assess the evidence from these experiments 
tend to support the existence of some deterrent effects for arrest. First, a 
qualitative assessment summarized the findings from the original 
Minneapolis study and the five replication studies by arguing that the general 
direction of the findings from three studies favored deterrent effects and that 
the general direction of the other three studies favored escalation effects. This 
review also argued that arrest had different effects on different types of 
offenders.50 A detailed summary of the published findings from the 
Minneapolis experiment, the five replication experiments, and from a 
companion experiment on arrest warrants51 identified a total of thirty-five 
common tests of specific deterrence; twenty-five (71%) of those tests were 
in the direction of a deterrent effect and ten (29%) were in the direction of an 
escalation effect. Eight of the twenty-five deterrent effects and none of the 
escalation effects were statistically significant.52 
A meta-analysis of the findings from the six arrest experiments limited 
only to data derived from victim interviews found an overall deterrent effect 
for arrest.53 An analysis of individual-level archived data for all five 
replications involving 4,032 incidents with adult male suspects reported that, 
 
CRIMINOLOGY 170, 184–98 (1992) (reporting deterrent effect from both official records and 
from victim interviews, neither of which were statistically significant); Franklyn W. Dunford, 
David Huizinga & Delbert S. Elliot, The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha 
Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183, 195–202 (1990) (showing deterrent effects from 
victim interview and escalation effects from official records, neither of which were statistically 
significant); J. David Hirschel, Ira W. Hutchinson, III & Charles W. Dean, The Failure of 
Arrest to Deter Spouse Abuse, 29 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 19–28 (1992) (also showing 
deterrent effects from victim interview and escalation effects from official records, neither of 
which were statistically significant); Lawrence W. Sherman, Janelle D. Schmidt, Dennis P. 
Rogan, Douglas A. Smith, Patrick R. Gartin, Ellen G. Cohn, J. Collins & Anthony R. Bacich, 
The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence 
Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 150–56 (1992) (showing escalation effects 
for both official records and victim interviews, neither of which were statistically significant). 
 50 LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, JANELLE D. SCHMDIT & DENNIS P. ROGAN, POLICING 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 16–18 (1992). 
 51 Franklyn W. Dunford, System-Initiated Warrants for Suspects of Misdemeanor 
Domestic Assault: A Pilot Study, 7 JUST. Q. 631, 641–50 (1990) (reporting consistent deterrent 
effects for arrest warrants). 
 52 Joel Garner, Jeffrey Fagan & Christopher Maxwell, Published Findings from the 
Spouse Assault Replication Program: A Critical Review, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 
3, 11–20 (1995) . 
 53 David B. Sugarman & Sue Boney-McCoy, Research Synthesis in Family Violence: The 
Art of Reviewing the Research, 4 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA, 55, 66–69 
(2000). 
2021] DETERRENT EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 237 
based on victim interviews, arrest was associated with statistically significant 
reductions of 25% in the prevalence of new victimizations. The frequency of 
new victimizations was reduced by 30%. Based on official records, arrest 
was associated with an 8% reduction in the frequency of new victimizations, 
but those effects were not statistically significant.54 
Three teams of scholars have used non-experimental data extracted 
from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to further examine 
the specific deterrent effect of arrest. Based upon 2,565 incidents from 1992 
to 2002, Richard Felson and his colleagues found that arrest was correlated, 
but not significantly so, with a reduction in subsequent violence.55 Hyunkag 
Cho and Dina Wilke used a larger sample of 3,495 incidents the NCVS from 
1987 to 2003 and found a statistically significant specific deterrent effect for 
arresting intimate partner violence offenders.56 Min Xie and James Lynch 
reported a statistically significant deterrent effect for arrest among a sample 
of 1,336 victims of intimate partner violence in the NCVS during the period 
from 1996 through 2012; however, among a propensity score matched 
subsample of 688 victims, they report a nonsignificant effect in the direction 
of deterrence.57 
A recent non-experimental study based entirely on official police 
reports concerning 5,466 couples in Seattle, Washington found that arrest 
was associated with statistically significant reductions in both the prevalence 
and frequency of future incidents of physical abuse.58 Lastly, in the one study 
of the effects of arrest on subsequent intimate partner violence that measured 
individual perceptions of sanction costs, a national-level panel study found 
statistically significant negative associations between individual perceptions 
of the costs of arrest in 1986 with the prevalence of subsequent wife assault 
in 1987.59 While these nonexperimental studies generally rely on smaller 
samples and use less rigorous methods than the SARP experiments, the 
 
 54 Christopher D. Maxwell, Joel H. Garner & Jeffrey A. Fagan, The Preventive Effects of 
Arrest on Intimate Partner Violence: Research, Policy and Theory, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 51, 64–66 (2002). 
 55 Richard B. Felson, Jeffrey M. Ackerman & Catherine A. Gallagher, Police Intervention 
and the Repeat of Domestic Assault, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 563, 576–78 (2005). 
 56 Hyunkag Cho & Dina J. Wilke, Does Police Intervention in Intimate Partner Violence 
Work? Estimating the Impact of Batterer Arrest in Reducing Revictimization, 11 ADVANCES 
SOC. WORK 283, 291–92 (2010). 
 57 Min Xie & James P. Lynch, The Effects of Arrest, Reporting to the Police, and Victim 
Services on Intimate Partner Violence, 54 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 338, 353–55 (2017). 
 58 Vivian H. Lyons, Mary A. Kernic, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar, Victoria L. Holt & Marco 
Carone, Use of Multiple Failure Models in Injury Epidemiology: A Case Study of Arrest and 
Intimate Partner Violence Recidivism in Seattle, WA, 6 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 5–6 (2019). 
 59 Williams & Hawkins, supra note 35, at 301–05. 
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reported effects consistently show at least small reductions in repeat 
offending following arrest. However, none of the experimental and 
nonexperimental studies about the deterrent effects of arrest were included 
in prior reviews of deterrence research.60 
The existing research on the effects of arrest for intimate partner 
violence is large, diverse, methodologically strong, and finds numerous but 
not universal conditions under which some specific deterrent effects can be 
identified. The mixed findings about the specific deterrent effects of arrest 
suggest that it is plausible, but uncertain, that intimate partner violence 
offenders may be responsive to specific deterrent effects produced by more 
severe criminal sanctions, such as prosecution, conviction, and incarceration. 
D  DETERRENT EFFECTS OF POST-ARREST SANCTIONS  
The increased attention to and use of arrest as a preferred response to 
intimate partner violence in the 1980s generated heightened attention about 
whether those arrests were followed up with the filing of charges, convictions 
or incarceration of offenders.61 While some scholars have questioned 
whether more severe post-arrest sanctions would, on their own, have any 
deterrent effects on repeat intimate partner violence offending,62 there is 
widespread support for the use of these sanctions.63 Further evidence of 
support for the use of prosecution in domestic violence incidents is found in 
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,64 under which the federal 
government continues to provide financial support and training for the 
development of intimate partner violence law enforcement, prosecution, and 
victim services programs by state and local agencies.65 
 
 60 See supra note 28.  
 61 See Joan Zorza, Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970–1990, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 71–72 (1992). 
 62 Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMEN BATTERING: 
POLICY RESPONSES 95, 98–99 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991); Linda G. Mills, Mandatory 
Arrest and Prosecution Policies for Domestic Violence: A Critical Literature Review and the 
Case for More Research to Test Victim Empowerment Approaches, 25 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
306, 311–13 (1998). 
 63 See, e.g., Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 174–76 (1997); Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the 
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 881 (1994); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim 
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1909 (1996). 
 64 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 
Stat. 1796 (1994). 
 65 See 34 U.S.C. §§ 12511, 10441–50 (2018); Memorandum, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. on 
Violence Against Women, Formula Grant Programs (on file with J. Crim. L. & Criminology) 
(including funding requirements for law enforcement and prosecution programs). 
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Some researchers and advocates for the use of more severe post-arrest 
sanctions argued that prosecution and conviction in intimate partner violence 
cases are so infrequent that they were incapable of having any overall effect 
on offender behavior. Advocates for stronger sanctions have claimed that 
prosecution “is rarely used.”66 Leading researchers have asserted that there 
was “widespread underprosecution of domestic violence cases,”67 and that 
there were “extremely infrequent prosecutions and adjudication” of intimate 
partner violence.68 A report from the National Research Council stated that 
“prosecution rates of battering cases typically have been low.”69 If these 
assertions were accurate, it would be less important and more difficult to 
study whether post-arrest sanctions reduced repeat offending; however, a 
comprehensive review of 137 U.S. and Canadian studies reported that, while 
rates varied greatly between jurisdictions, on average: (1) one-third of 
reported offenses and three-fifths of recorded arrests for intimate partner 
violence resulted in the filing of criminal charges; and (2) more than half of 
all prosecutions for intimate partner violence resulted in a criminal 
conviction.70 While there are no comparable statistics on prosecution or 
conviction rates for other offenses, the use of post-arrest sanctions is 
sufficiently large and widespread to justify critical examination of the 
potential effects of those sanctions. 
Some scholars criticized the use of post-arrest criminal sanctions for 
intimate partner violence for other reasons. Jeffrey Fagan objected to using 
criminal sanctions as the primary mechanism to address intimate partner 
violence, citing the complexity of domestic violence incidents, variety in 
batterer types, and the vagaries of the criminal justice system.71 Both Donald 
Dutton and Linda Mills view mandated judicial and prosecutorial 
interventions as unduly diminishing the victims’ role in determining their 
own life course.72 In addition, David Ford reported that some victims prefer 
to separate themselves from the criminal justice system after the police have 
 
 66 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 212 (1979). 
 67 SHERMAN, SCHMIDT & ROGAN, supra note 52, at 244. 
 68 Alissa P. Worden, The Changing Boundaries of the Criminal Justice System: 
Redefining the Problem and the Response in Domestic Violence, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, 
at 215, 221 (2000). 
 69 NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 118 (Nancy A. 
Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996). 
 70 Joel H. Garner & Christopher D. Maxwell, Prosecution and Conviction Rates for 
Intimate Partner Violence, 34 CRIM. JUST. REV., 44, 53–54 (2009). 
 71 JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 
28–40 (1996). 
 72 DONALD G. DUTTON, RETHINKING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 271 (2006); LINDA G. MILLS, 
INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE 11 (2003). 
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helped them resolve a particular violent incident.73 These criticisms 
recognize possible impediments connected with mobilizing the criminal law, 
but they do not directly question the existence of specific deterrent effects 
when sanctions are applied. 
The evidence supporting specific deterrent effects for arrest and the 
widespread official support for post-arrest sanctions enhances the importance 
of understanding the extent to which post-arrest criminal sanctions are 
associated with changes in future incidents of intimate partner violence. The 
only published review of the research on the deterrent effects of post-arrest 
sanctions on intimate partner identified thirty-one reports published between 
1984 and 2005 that reported 143 statistical comparisons of offending rates 
following prosecution, conviction, or incarceration for intimate partner 
violence.74 Those statistical comparisons were analyzed by counting whether 
the reported findings were in the direction predicted by deterrence theory and 
whether those findings reached the commonly accepted level of statistical 
significance.75 Using this approach, this study found 24% of the reported 
findings showed more severe sanctions associated with less repeat offending, 
providing support for the deterrence hypothesis. Only 10% of the tests 
showed that more severe sanctions were associated with more repeat 
offending, supporting the escalation hypothesis. 66% of 143 statistical 
comparisons of prosecution, conviction, and incarceration sanctions 
generated no differences in repeat offending by the type of sanction received. 
These proportions varied by sanction type. 39% of the prosecution tests were 
associated with less repeat offending and only 6% were associated with more 
repeat offending. About equal proportions of the statistical tests for 
conviction and incarceration were and were not supportive of deterrent 
effects. Thus, the one prior effort to assess the existing research found that 
there appeared to be limited support for the existence of deterrence effects 
associated with post-arrest sanctions and that the limited support for deterrent 
effects varied by the type of post-arrest sanction. 
The one existing review of the research on post-arrest sanctions has 
several limitations. First, it was not based on a systematic search of the 
existing literature and it did not explicitly define differences between the 
three sanction types. Second, it treated all the studies the same regardless of 
 
 73 David A. Ford, Prosecution as a Victim Power Resource: A Note on Empowering 
Women in Violent Conjugal Relationships, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313, 315–17 (1991). 
 74 Christopher D. Maxwell & Joel H. Garner, Crime Control Effects of Criminal Sanctions 
for Intimate Partner Violence, 3 PARTNER ABUSE 469, 484–85 (2012). 
 75 These tests compared re-offending rates between offenders who were prosecuted with 
those who were not prosecuted; between those who were convicted with those who were not 
convicted; and those who were incarcerated with those that were not incarcerated. 
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their methodological rigor or the number of cases involved. Third, it did not 
consider the lack of independence among the tests, since as many as fifteen 
tests were generated from the same sample of cases. Lastly, the analysis of 
these 143 statistical tests is a simple count of the direction and statistical 
significance of reported findings without consideration of the relative size of 
the effects reported; thus, a test producing just marginally statistically 
significant results counts the same as a test whose effect is much larger. This 
approach is considered methodologically weak and unlikely to produce a 
reliable assessment of empirical research findings.76 
II. DESIGN OF THIS RESEARCH 
This research applies more rigorous contemporary meta-analytic 
methods to assess the existing body of research on the specific deterrent 
effects of post-arrest criminal sanctions imposed on individuals accused of 
intimate partner violence. Our substantive focus is on the conditions under 
which specific deterrent effects do and do not exist. Our methodological 
focus is on the appropriate quantitative methods to test for the direction, size 
and statistical significance of these effects in the available research literature. 
Our statistical analyses are designed to address two questions. First, to what 
extent are post-arrest criminal sanctions—prosecution, conviction, or jail—
associated with lower rates of subsequent intimate partner violence? Second, 
do characteristics of the study designs used in this body of research moderate 
the association of sanctions with subsequent behavior? Our substantive 
conclusions on deterrence effects stem primarily from the answers to the first 
question; the answers to the second question are intended primarily to inform 
the designs of future research on the use of sanctions for intimate partner 
violence. 
A. META-ANALYTIC METHODS 
Since its development as an independent specialty in the statistical 
sciences in the 1980s, meta-analysis has developed into a variety of formal 
processes for explicitly incorporating multiple characteristics of individual 
studies within a common research framework and is now used widely within 
criminology to summarize existing research examining a public policy or a 
scientific hypothesis;77 meta-analytic methods produce standardized effect 
sizes for reported results and summarize those results within and between the 
 
 76 FRANK L. SCHMIDT & JOHN E. HUNTER, METHODS OF META-ANALYSIS: CORRECTING 
ERROR AND BIAS IN RESEARCH FINDINGS 453–57 (3d ed. 2015). 
 77 See Edward Wells, Uses of Meta‐Analysis in Criminal Justice Research: A Quantitative 
Review, 26 JUST. Q. 268, 275–87 (2009). 
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available studies. In criminology (and other applied fields), meta-analyses 
typically produce two types of findings: first, an assessment of the empirical 
support for a particular theory, policy, or program; and second, an assessment 
of the quality of the existing research literature. Meta-analytic methods 
involve a number of explicit choices about how to define and identify the 
relevant research literature, how to compute standardized effect sizes, how 
to select among multiple analyses reported within individual studies, how to 
weigh and combine the contribution of individual studies, and how to assess 
the likelihood that unidentified studies may influence the findings of the 
meta-analysis. These explicit methods are contrasted against the potential for 
more subjective and implicit judgments about these same issues in qualitative 
literature reviews and in quantitative reviews that do not clearly and formally 
articulate how they identify and analyze the available research. Despite these 
differences, both qualitative and quantitative methods of research synthesis 
are constrained by the nature, quality, and size of the available research on a 
particular topic. 
B. SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH 
To be considered for inclusion in this meta-analysis, a study needed to 
report about individuals who were alleged to have committed an intimate 
partner violence offense, or who were charged with or convicted of a violent 
offense against an intimate partner. The second criterion for inclusion is that 
the study reported a quantitative estimate at the individual level about the 
relationship between actual post-arrest dispositions of criminal charges for 
intimate partner violence and rates of subsequent offending by the suspects 
in those cases. This meta-analysis excludes analyses that used summary rates 
of case disposition and repeat offending aggregated at the court or 
jurisdiction level. 
These criteria are derived from our interest in testing hypotheses about 
specific deterrence. Our search for prior research had no restriction based on 
the sample size or the type of statistical analyses reported. This meta-analysis 
includes studies regardless of when their data were collected, when their 
results were published, or the format of the written report. The review 
considered English-language refereed journal articles, book chapters, books, 
working papers, case reports, dissertations, and government reports. 
While the design of this research is structured to assess the specific 
deterrent effects of prosecution, conviction and incarceration, most of the 
studies in this body of research conceptualized and articulated their efforts 
not as a test of deterrence theory, but as atheoretical comparisons of the 
effectiveness of one or more disposition types versus other disposition types. 
For instance, Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite reported comparisons between 
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defendants whose charges were dismissed versus those who were acquitted 
at trial; they also compared defendants who were convicted and fined to those 
who were convicted and sentenced to probation.78 While these differences 
might be important for other criminological purposes, within our conceptual 
approach comparisons between dismissals and acquittals and between fines 
and probation do not produce a clear contrast between a less severe sanction 
and a more severe sanction and, therefore, were not considered as tests of 
specific deterrence theory. In addition to excluding aggregate-level analyses, 
the review is limited to comparisons of sanctions actually imposed on an 
individual and does not include tests that compared two or more sanction 
policies unless the report also included details about the nature and severity 
of the sanctions actually imposed in each case. 
Because the primary objective of this research is to test deterrence 
theory, the meta-analysis established some theory-specific rules to code the 
nature of post-arrest criminal sanctions. The taken approach placed all 
criminal dispositions reported in the research into one of four categories of 
increasing severity: not prosecuted, prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated. 
This conceptualization distinguishes between changes in legal status based 
on concrete actions by prosecutors, juries, or judges: filing of criminal 
charges, conviction in court, and a sentence involving incarceration. In this 
understanding of criminal sanctions, the more severe sanctions subsume the 
less severe ones—imprisoned defendants had been convicted and convicted 
defendants had been charged. Each reported comparison between a more 
severe sanction and a less severe sanction is a test of deterrence theory. 
Prosecuted cases compared to cases that were not prosecuted constitute a test 
of the specific deterrent effects of prosecution. Convicted cases compared to 
cases not convicted constitute a test of the specific deterrent effects of 
conviction and incarcerated cases compared to cases not incarcerated 
constitute a test of the specific deterrent effects of incarceration. 
This theoretical approach generates three sanction-specific null 
hypotheses: 
1. There is no difference in the rate of repeat offending for prosecuted 
and not prosecuted intimate partner violence offenders. 
2. There is no difference in the rate of repeat offending for convicted 
and not convicted intimate partner violence offenders. 
3. There is no difference in the rate of repeat offending for incarcerated 
and not incarcerated intimate partner violence offenders. 
 
 78 John Wooldredge & Amy Thistlethwaite, Court Dispositions and Rearrest for Intimate 
Assault, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 75, 86 (2005). 
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1. Studies Identified 
Using the selection criteria stated above and following established 
approaches for searching for prior research documents,79 this research 
completed a multiple keyword search of numerous online science publication 
indexes, reviewed the abstracts of the identified studies to identify potentially 
eligible ones, and conducted detailed reviews of publications that might 
include eligible studies. Our search strategy used the following indexes: the 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service’s (NCJRS) abstracts database, 
the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data’s (NACJD) Online 
Bibliography of Data-related Literature, ProQuest, Academic OneFile, 
Elsevier Scopus, PubMed.gov, and the Web of Science (SSCI). Our searches 
relied on three sets of relevant terms that best represent our key, intertwined 
topics of intimate partner violence (fifteen terms), criminal court disposition 
(fifteen terms), and recidivism (eleven terms).80 However, pilot searches 
revealed that searching a term independently produced a large number of hits 
that were irrelevant to our focus. For instance, searching the phrase “intimate 
partner violence” on its own generated 24,791 hits, and the term “recidivism” 
resulted in 42,459 hits, each in a single electronic resource. Thus, we used 
composite search commands with terms such as “and,” “or,” and “not.” 
Additionally, our searches were also filtered by the following disciplines: 
criminology, criminal justice, victimology, corrections, law and society, 
criminal rehabilitation, social problems, women’s studies, family welfare, 
sociology, and social science. 
In addition to using these search terms, this review manually examined 
bibliographies of relevant articles, books, and reviews for additional studies. 
Once potential studies were identified, citations to those studies were 
searched for additional studies using Google scholar.81  
  
 
 79 See generally David Moher, Alessandro Liberati, Jennifer Tetzlaff, Douglas G. Altman 
& The PRISMA Group, Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses: The PRISMA Statement, 6 PLOS MED. 1 (2009) (describing guidelines for 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses). 
 80 See infra Appendix 1 for lists of the search terms used for the systematic literature 
search. 
 81 See Jeffrey G. Reed & Pam M. Baxter, Using Reference Databases, in THE HANDBOOK 
OF RESEARCH SYNTHESIS AND META-ANALYSIS 73, 89–90 (Harris Cooper, Larry V. Hedges & 
Jeffrey C. Valentine eds., 2d ed. 2009) (identifying alternative ways to conduct citation 
searches and the assumptions underlying their use). 
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Figure 1: Identification of Research on Repeat Offending  
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The results of searching the existing databases to identify reports about 
repeat offending following any post-arrest sanction for intimate partner 
violence are displayed in Figure 1. Our initial keyword search identified 935 
indexed publications and an additional 45 publications through a review of 
bibliographic references and citations. After removing 263 duplicate 
publications, 717 publication abstracts were reviewed by one or more 
authors. The review of abstracts resulted in rejecting an additional 538 
documents that did not include the type of research that met our inclusion 
criteria. The full-text review of the 179 potentially eligible studies required 
multiple reviews by all three co-authors to determine the exact nature of the 
reported findings, the sample sizes involved, and the direction of the reported 
effects. Moreover, the full-text review identified ten instances where the 
reported findings did not include all the information needed to produce a 
standardized effect—mostly standard errors or sample sizes. While meta-
analyses would traditionally exclude these tests from their review, this 
approach was to contact the authors of those reports by email requesting the 
missing information about standard errors and sample sizes. Seven of the ten 
contacted authors provided the information needed to compute standardized 
effect sizes and these additional tests were included in this meta-analysis. 
The selection criteria in this meta-analysis identified 237 tests of the 
specific deterrent effects of post-arrest sanctions for intimate partner violence 
in 29 documents (See Table 1). Published between 1989 and 2013, these 
documents used samples that ranged in size from seventy-four to 66,759 case 
dispositions. This literature includes analyses of more than 127,000 criminal 
incidents from thirty-three U.S. or Canadian jurisdictions. The full-text 
review of these publications also revealed that some publications included 
more than one independent sample of cases. For instance, in 2003, Peterson 
reported findings from a large sample of cases from all of New York City 
with three tests of conviction and three tests of incarceration.82 In the same 
publication, Peterson also reported findings limited to Bronx County with 
two tests of prosecution, two tests of conviction and two tests of 
incarceration.83 In 2004, Peterson reported new findings from two samples—
one from the last three months of 1998 and another from the first three 
months of 2001—in New York County (Manhattan). For each sample, 
 
 82 RICHARD R. PETERSON, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, THE IMPACT OF CASE PROCESSING 
ON RE-ARRESTS AMONG DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS IN NEW YORK CITY 43–49 (2003) 
(displaying the results of three bivariate tests and three multivariate tests in the New York City 
sample). 
 83 Id. at 26–28; 30–34 (also displaying the results of three bi-variate and three multivariate 
tests for the Bronx sample but in a different configuration). 
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Peterson reported one test of the conviction and one test of incarceration.84 
Thus, in this example, our search process identified two documents, with four 
samples, five studies and twelve tests of specific deterrence. As displayed in 
Table 1, the complete results of our search process generated ten studies of 
the prosecution hypothesis, twenty-six studies of the conviction hypothesis, 
and twenty-one studies of the incarceration hypothesis. 
 
 84 RICHARD R. PETERSON, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, THE IMPACT OF MANHATTAN’S 
SPECIALIZED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT 57–61 (2004) (reporting one multivariate test of 
conviction and one multivariate test of incarceration in each sample). 
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2. Multiple Tests within Studies 
The reporting of multiple tests within a single study is typically 
encouraged within criminology and other scientific disciplines as a way for 
an individual study to demonstrate either the strength or generalizability of 
particular findings. However, multiple tests create problems for all 
approaches to research synthesis because it is not clear which tests, or 
combination of tests, to consider and how to weight the importance of one 
test over another. The particular nature of that problem for this meta-analysis 
is revealed in Table 1, which lists for each publication the number of 
individual tests of specific deterrence with each of our three sanction types—
prosecution, conviction, and incarceration. Twelve of the thirty-three studies 
in Table 1 report tests for only one sanction type. However, fifteen report 
tests for two sanction types and six report tests for all three sanction types. 
Because some studies sometimes use some of the same incidents to test 
multiple sanction types, our tests across these three sanction types are not 
completely independent of each other. For this reason, we emphasize the 
separate results from each sanction type. 
There is a second, and more important, concern about the independence 
of the 237 statistical tests reported in Table 1. Multiple tests of a particular 
hypothesis can occur in a number of different ways, such as when authors 
use data on repeat offending from victim interviews and official records, or 
when they report repeat offending for both three months after the sanction 
and separately for six months after the sanction. For instance, Peterson 
reports three tests of the conviction hypothesis in his New York City sample. 
One of those tests is produced by a bivariate analysis of any subsequent 
offenses against anyone. The second test is a bivariate analysis of any 
subsequent violent offense against any domestic partner and the third test is 
a multivariate analysis of the same offense and victim type as the second test. 
All three of these tests use the same set of individual case dispositions, and 
using all three tests would violate traditional statistical assumptions that each 
test is an independent estimate of the relationship under investigation.85 
When dependences exist between one or more tests, there is a greater 
likelihood of producing biased and imprecise estimates or falsely rejecting a 
true null hypothesis.86 There are additional statistical concerns in this 
 
 85 See NOEL A. CARD, APPLIED META-ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 191–94 
(2012). 
 86 See Mariola Moeyaert, Maaike Ugille, S. Natasha Beretvas, John Ferron, Rommel 
Bunuan & Wim Van den Noortgate, Methods for Dealing with Multiple Outcomes in Meta-
Analysis: A Comparison Between Averaging Effect Sizes, Robust Variance Estimation and 
Multilevel Meta-Analysis, 20 INT’L J. SOC. RSCH. METHODOLOGY, 559, 567–69 (2017); Betsy 
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research because some studies reported many tests and other studies reported 
only a few tests, or just a single one. 
C. USING THE “BEST” TEST METHOD 
The design of this research addresses the lack of independence among 
multiple tests of the same hypothesis within a single study by selecting the 
one “best” test based on the methodological rigor of the available tests within 
each study.87 For instance, in Peterson’s test of the conviction hypothesis 
referenced earlier, the methodologically strongest test is the multivariate 
analysis using only violence offenses against an intimate partner. In addition 
to the merits of estimating the size of the deterrent effect based on standards 
of methodological rigor, this approach also benefits from directly estimating 
standard errors based on a single test. In selecting the “best” test, we assume 
that there are sufficiently clear methodological preferences for some types of 
analyses over others, that these preferences can be applied objectively to the 
existing research, and that these rules will result in the identification of the 
single “best” test within each study. 
Based on the nature of the research found and the hypotheses tested in 
this research, the “best” test was identified using seven criteria for selecting 
from among duplicate tests within each of the fifty-seven studies listed in 
Table 1. These criteria are the type of analyses, the size of the treatment 
group, the length of the follow-up period, the source of data, the offense type, 
the victim type, and the criterion (e.g., re-offense, re-arrest, re-conviction) 
used to denote recidivism. 
For analysis type, we selected multivariate over bivariate results, and 
then among multiple multivariate analyses, selected count regression models 
over survival analyses and survival analyses over logistic regression. Among 
bivariate models, counts and means were selected over correlations and 
correlations over simple prevalence measures. If there were still multiple 
tests after selecting from among these analysis types, we selected tests with 
the largest treatment group or the longest follow-up period as the preferred 
test. If these criteria were not sufficient to identify a “best” test, the use of 
victim interviews were preferred over official records, outcome measures 
based on new offenses were preferred over measures based on new arrests 
and use of new arrests was preferred over new convictions. If these criteria 
 
J. Becker, Multivariate Meta-Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 
AND MATHEMATICAL MODELING 499, 502–03 (Howard E. A. Tinsley & Steven D. Brown eds., 
2000); MICHAEL BORENSTEIN, LARRY V. HEDGES, JULIAN P. T. HIGGINS & HANNAH R. 
ROTHSTEIN, Multiple Outcomes or Time-Points within a Study, in INTRODUCTION TO META-
ANALYSIS 225, 226–27 (2009). 
 87 MARK W. LIPSEY & DAVID B. WILSON, PRACTICAL META-ANALYSIS 113 (2001). 
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were not sufficient to identify a unique test for a particular hypothesis, 
outcome measures of violent offenses were preferred over non-violent 
offenses, and measures of offenses against the same victim were preferred 
over those against any victim. 
While the statistical analysis, sample size, follow-up period, and the use 
of offense measures are more generic criteria for methodological rigor, the 
preference for tests involving violent offenses and the same or similar victims 
stem from our focus on deterrence of re-offending, not rearrest, and on 
intimate partner violence rather than violence in general. Arrest records are 
relatively easy to obtain, but often reflect police behavior as much as an 
offender’s behavior towards their partner. Criminologists have long argued 
that arrest, conviction, and incarceration data are more appropriately viewed 
as measures of official response to criminal behavior rather than of offense 
rates or offenders themselves.88 Moreover, the use of increased criminal 
sanctions for intimate partner violence is primarily designed to reduce future 
violence against intimate partners, not all types of offenses against all types 
of victims. In addition, a large proportion of intimate partner violence stems 
from multiple incidents with the same victim, which increases the preference 
for using measures of offense frequency over prevalence or time to failure 
measures in this research.89 
In twenty-two studies, only one test was reported; in those instances, we 
selected that test as the “best.” Applying our criteria to the existing research 
on the specific deterrent effects of criminal sanctions, twelve of the “best” 
tests we selected were based on the use of multivariate analyses, the use of 
frequency measures, or the use of longer follow-up periods. In eleven tests, 
the sample size/follow-up period was the determining factor in selecting the 
“best” test. In five studies, we chose tests because they used re-offense as the 
criteria for recidivism. Six tests were picked because they defined repeat 
offending for violent offenses only, and we selected one test because it 
measured repeat offending of the same victim. The potential impact of using 
these selection criteria can be seen in Table 2, which reports the frequency of 
all 237 reported tests and the “best” tests on the seven selection criteria. 
Among all reported tests, only 55% were multivariate analyses; among the 
fifty-seven “best” tests, 72% of the tests were multivariate. In addition, forty-
 
 88 See John I. Kitsuse & Aaron V. Cicourel, A Note on the Uses of Official Statistics, 11 
SOC. PROBS. 131, 132–34 (1963); DELBERT S. ELLIOTT, CTR. FOR THE STUDY & PREVENTION 
OF VIOLENCE, LIES, DAMN LIES, AND ARREST STATISTICS 3–5 (1995); Terence P. Thornberry 
& Marvin D. Krohn, Comparison of Self-Report and Official Data for Measuring Crime, in 
MEASURMENT PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 43, 43–48 (John V. Pepper & Carol 
V. Petrie eds., 2003). 
 89 Garner, Fagan & Maxwell, supra note 52, at 16–18. 
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four (77.2%) of the “best” tests count only violent repeat offending compared 
to 159 (67.1%) of all tests. Despite these improvements, the “best” tests use 
victim interviews only 22.8% of the time; for all tests they were used in 
27.8%. Thus, this approach used tests that have some preferred 
methodological characteristics, but it can only select the “best” from among 
the available studies. Perhaps most importantly, this approach provides a 
strong basis for assuming independence between research observations 
within each of the three sanction hypotheses. The use of the “best” test 
approach was determined prior to the search for studies and the calculation 
of standard effect sizes. 
To be consistent with prior deterrence research, the original design of 
this study specified testing three distinct hypotheses about the deterrent 
effects of sanctions and called for the use of a two-sided t test with the 
traditional criterion of p < .05 for the determination of statistical significance. 
The problems inherent in relying solely on this arbitrary standard recently led 
the American Statistical Association (ASA) to recommend that 
“[r]esearchers should bring many contextual factors into play to derive 
scientific inferences.”90 Our use of a predetermined p value of 0.05 is 
consistent with the approach recommended by John Ioannidis.91 However, 
we provide some qualitative context for our reported findings and report the 
results of several sensitivity tests about our quantitative analyses, such as 
simple counts of statistical tests and revised meta-analytic findings when 
tests with the largest and smallest effect sizes are removed. 
 
 
 90 Ronald L. Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA Statement on p-Values: Context, 
Process, and Purpose, 70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129, 131 (2016). 
 91 John P.A. Ioannidis, The Importance of Predefined Rules and Prespecified Statistical 
Analyses: Do Not Abandon Significance, 321 JAMA 2067, 2067–68 (2019). 
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D. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING INDEPENDENCE 
A number of prominent researchers have recommended the use of 
alternative approaches for addressing the issue of multiple tests in prior 
research. The first alternative approach uses the average of all tests within 
each study to estimate both the size and the variance of each effect, even 
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though the use of the average of multiple variances has limited justification.92 
The second alternative approach also uses the average effect size across all 
reported tests but uses statistical procedures to better estimate “robust” 
standard errors. “Robust” standard errors are often, but not always, larger 
than the actual standard errors.93 A third alternative approach is to use 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), which simultaneously estimates effects 
sizes and standard deviations within and between studies.94 All four of these 
approaches employ the traditional inverse-variance weighting method that 
gives greater weight to effects from larger studies whose smaller standard 
errors produce more precise effect size estimates.95 These alternative 
approaches rely on different underlying assumptions about the nature of the 
existing research, the ability to rank order research methods, the amount and 
importance of statistical independence of reported tests, and the relative 
importance of different objectives of a meta-analysis. Despite the many 
similarities in the methods used by these four approaches, we think that the 
substantive arguments for using the “best” test approach are compelling and 
our conclusions rely heavily on the “best” test approach. 
All of the approaches used to estimate deterrence effects use the same 
method to convert the results from different types of statistical tests published 
in the original reports into a common metric. Consistent with the 
recommendations made by several analysists, the logged odds ratio is used 
for this purpose.96 To create logged odds ratios for all 237 tests, the bivariate 
proportions, mean differences, correlations, and regression coefficients, 
along with their associated measures of variance and relevant sample sizes, 
were entered into Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (version #3) (CMA) to 
produce a standardized odds ratio with associated standard errors for each of 
the 237 tests. The resulting standardized effects sizes and variance estimates 
 
 92 Fulgencio Marín-Martínez & Julio Sánchez-Meca, Averaging Dependent Effect Sizes 
in Meta-Analysis: A Cautionary Note About Procedures, 2 SPANISH J. PSYCH. 32, 37 (1999). 
 93 Larry V. Hedges, Elizabeth Tipton & Matthew C. Johnson, Robust Variance Estimation 
in Meta-Regression with Dependent Effect Size Estimates, 1 RSCH. SYNTHESIS METHODS 39, 
45 (2010). 
 94 See generally STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR 
MODELS: APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODs (2d ed. 2002) (providing examples 
and explanations of the theory and use of hierarchical linear models). 
 95 Moeyaert, Ugille, Beretvas, Ferron, Bunuan & Van den Noortgate, supra note 86, at 
561–62; Larry Hedges & Kimberly Maier, Meta-Analysis, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
MULTILEVEL MODELING 487, 497 (Mark A. Scott, Jeffrey S. Simonoff & Brian D. Marx eds., 
2013). 
 96 Joseph. L. Fleiss & Jesse A. Berlin, Effect sizes for dichotomous data, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH SYNTHESIS AND META-ANALYSIS, 237 (Harris Cooper, Larry V. 
Hedges & Jeffrey C. Valentine, eds., 2d ed. 2009); TERRI D. PIGOTT, ADVANCES IN META-
ANALYSIS 11–12 (2012); LIPSEY & WILSON, supra note 87, at 53. 
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produced by CMA are used in all four of the approaches we use to estimate 
specific deterrent effects. When using logged odds ratios, coefficients equal 
to zero represent no impact of the criminal sanction. In our comparison of 
more severe versus less severe sanctions, negative coefficients indicate a 
deterrent effect while positive coefficients indicate an escalation or 
criminogenic effect. Since the underlying population effect is likely to vary 




A. BEST EFFECTS 
Figure 2 presents a forest plot of the results of each study’s “best” test 
sorted from the smallest estimated log odds ratio—the one most supportive 
of deterrence—to the highest estimated log odds ratio—the one least 
supportive of deterrence of the prosecution hypothesis. We also present the 
confidence interval for that estimate, the value of the two-sided z test, the p 
value for that test, and the relative weight of each study resulting from the 
use of inverse-variance weighting method. The relative weight among these 
studies varied from about three to almost twenty percent. Seven of the ten 
studies of the prosecution hypothesis produce an effect in the direction of a 
deterrent effect, and three of these effects exceed the 1.96 standard threshold 
for a statistically significant t test. These three studies combined relative 
weight is about twenty percent. 
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None of the three studies producing a log odds ratio in the direction of 
an escalation effect produced a statistically significant effect. However, the 
combined weight of the studies reporting escalation effects exceeds forty 
percent. A traditional literature review or vote-counting approach to 
synthesizing findings would likely find the seven-to-three ratio of results 
supportive of an overall deterrent effect; however, the relatively small 
number of studies and the substantial weight given to several studies not 
supportive of deterrent effects produce a meta-analytic finding in the 
direction of deterrence (-0.196) but with a nonsignificant p value of 0.095. 
We tested the sensitivity of this finding by removing the prosecution study 
most supportive of deterrence; this nine-study analysis produces a mean odds 
ratio to -.115, which is also not statistically significant. However, the 
prosecution results are sensitive to removing the study least supportive of 
deterrence; the analysis of the remaining nine studies produces a mean odds 
ratio of -0.246 with a statistically significant p value of .041. 
In the same format as Figure 2, Figure 3 lists the twenty-six studies 
testing the specific deterrent effects of conviction. While fifteen (58%) of 
these studies produce effects predicted by deterrence theory, just two of those 
reported findings are statistically significant. Of the eleven studies showing 
an effect for the conviction sanction in the direction of escalation, three 
produce a statistically significant effect. The relative weights of these twenty-
six studies range from 1.55 to 5.78, suggesting less dominance by any one 
study or group of studies than was present in testing the prosecution 
hypothesis. The meta-analytic summary of these twenty-six studies produces 
an effect size 0.021, which is not only small but is in the opposite direction 
from what one would expect to find if convictions produced a deterrent 
effect. Removing the study most supportive or least supportive of deterrence 
does not change the direction or statistical significance of the conviction 
effect. 
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Figure 4 lists the twenty-one studies which report on the specific 
deterrent effects of incarceration. Nine of these studies report an effect in the 
direction of deterrence, but only two of those are statistically significant. Of 
the twelve studies that reported an escalation effect, seven of them are 
statistically significant. The relative weights of these twenty-one studies 
range from a low of 1.08 to a high of 6.08, with no clear tendency for studies 
with a deterrent or escalation effect. With a seven-to-two ratio of statistically 
significant effects, a literature review or a vote-counting synthesis of these 
studies would likely reach a conclusion that incarceration is associated with 
more repeat offending. Our meta-analysis produced a statistically significant 
(p value = 0.001) log odds ratio of 0.367 which points towards an escalation 
of offending rather than a reduction in offending. Thus, in contrast to less 
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severe sanctions like prosecution or conviction, incarceration of intimate 
partner violence offenders is associated with a large, statistically significant 
increase in their rate of offending. 
However, among these twenty-one studies, one effect size is five times 
larger than the next largest effect. Removing this one outlier reduces the 
average effect size to 0.269, but it is still substantial and statistically 
significant with a p value of 0.012. Removing the study that is most 
supportive of a deterrent effect for incarceration increases the log odds of 
escalation to 0.405 with a p value of less than .000. 
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As displayed in Table 3, using the “best” test approach generates distinct 
findings for each of the three hypotheses about post-arrest sanctions tested 
here. The ten prosecution studies produce a modest-sized effect in the 
direction of deterrence, but these findings do not meet the traditional two-
sided t test for statistical significance. Our confidence in the prosecution 
findings, however, is limited by the small number of studies, the large 
variation in study impact due to the inverse-variance weighting procedure, 
and the sensitivity of these findings when removing the most and least 
favorable studies. Conversely, the existence of twenty-six more evenly 
weighted studies of the conviction hypothesis and the lack of an effect from 
removing outlier studies increases our confidence in the findings that there is 
no deterrent or escalation effect for the sanction of conviction. The twenty-
one tests of the incarceration hypothesis produce a large effect in the 
direction of escalation effect exceeds the standards for statistical significance 
even when an extreme outlier is removed. 
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Some scholars are critical of the potential lack of objectivity in the 
selection of “best” tests. They and other scholars recommend the use of 
alternative meta-analytic methods for addressing the non-independence of 
research observations. This criticism of using the “best” test, if well founded, 
would undermine one of the main goals of meta-analysis, which is to remove 
the bias inherent in unstructured, qualitative methods of reviewing research 
literature. In order to address this concern, Table 3 reports the findings of our 
meta-analyses and the findings that are generated using three alternative 
meta-analytic methods. The first alternative approach averages effects within 
each study (Average). The second alternative approach uses all tests as 
independent effects but uses robust standard errors to estimate coefficients 
and compute statistical tests (RSE).97 The third alternative approach uses 
hierarchical models incorporating other study level and effect level tests 
(HLM).98 Table 3 reports the summary findings for each of the three sanction 
hypotheses for all four meta-analytic approaches.99 
While there are some differences in the size of the log odds ratios and 
standard errors between the four approaches, the substantive findings are 
strikingly similar. The findings of no effect for convictions and escalation 
effects for incarceration remain consistent across all four approaches. The 
findings for prosecution effects are all supportive of deterrence but, for all 
three of the alternative approaches, the p values exceed the traditional 0.05 
standard, where the “best” test finding does not. However, the p values for 
two of the three alternative approaches to test the prosecution hypothesis 
exceed the 0.05 standard by just 0.004 and 0.006, producing the same 
dilemma of using a fixed standard, only this time on the side of finding a 
statistically significant effect. Similar to our conviction and incarceration 
findings, other criminological meta-analyses have reported consistent 
findings when implementing multiple meta-analytical approaches to the 
same body of research.100 
Our conclusion to accept the null hypothesis that prosecution does not 
affect repeat intimate partner violence is based on the findings produced by 
the “best” test approach to meta-analysis. Our preference for using these 
 
 97 Hedges, Tipton & Johnson, supra note 93, at 41. 
 98 RAUDENBUSH & BRYK, supra note 94, at 208–10. 
 99 The results from the first two approaches—using the best and the average effect—were 
calculated using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Version 3. The results from the “RSE” 
approach were calculated using SPSS 25. The HLM results were produced using HLM 7: 
Hierarchical linear and nonlinear modeling. 
 100 Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of Suspect 
Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 489 (2011) (reporting, in Table 2, 
statistically significant odds-ratios between 1.53 and 1.74 for meta-analysis approaches using 
the average smallest, largest, and best effect sizes). 
260 GARNER, MAXWELL & LEE [Vol. 111 
criteria over others is because our initial design included establishing explicit 
rules for selecting the best test among those reported in our 29 studies. We 
established these criteria and the use of the p < .05 standard with two-tailed 
test before we extracted data from publications to generate logged odds ratios 
and standard errors or compiled our forest plots or the formal statistical 
analyses reported in Table 3. As noted earlier, there is controversy in the 
research community about the value of retaining the .05 standard and there 
are multiple approaches to producing meta-analyses. Each approach has 
strengths and weaknesses and all have been used in articles appearing in 
refereed journals. Because there are advocates for each of these approaches, 
conclusions produced by only one approach could easily be regarded as 
suspect to some readers. While some scholars reject findings unless they are 
derived from an approach they prefer, we and others believe it is important 
to present results from multiple approaches so others can understand the 
extent to which findings vary by different meta-analysis approaches. We also 
believe that differences in outcome should not influence our preferences for 
one methodological approach over another. 
In our meta-analyses, all four alternative approaches produced 
consistent findings for the conviction and incarceration hypotheses; 
therefore, those conclusions are not dependent on the approach we used. 
However, the three alternative approaches to testing the prosecution 
hypothesis do not produce findings consistent with those produced by the 
“best” test approach. While each approach produced a finding in the 
deterrence direction, only the “best” test approach did not meet the p < .05 
level. Our reporting of findings from the three alternative approaches 
clarifies that the failure to find a statistically significant deterrent effect for 
prosecution depends on the approach we took. However, that does not mean 
that we give the findings from the alternative approaches equal weight in our 
conclusion about the effect of prosecution. Similarly, those who prefer 
alternative approaches need not give equal weight to our approach in their 
judgement about the effect of prosecution. Thus, while willing to report 
findings from alternative approaches, this paper relies on the findings from 
the statistical tests specified in our original design to determine the existence 
of statistically significant effects. 
Traditionally, meta-analyses are concerned about the bias that might 
result from the existence of completed studies that are not reported and 
therefore cannot be included in a systematic review.101 The principal 
concerns have been the failure of authors to submit—or of journals to 
 
 101 See Robert Rosenthal, The “File Drawer Problem” and Tolerance for Null Results, 86 
PSYCH. BULL. 638, 640 (1979). 
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publish—findings that either (1) find no statistically significant effects, or (2) 
are contrary to the accepted findings. We are less concerned with this issue 
because many available studies included here report no statistically 
significant differences, the ready availability of a large number of 
unpublished studies and the diverse findings in this field suggest that no 
particular finding is likely to be seen as the only acceptable finding. 
However, there is another concern that the available research may reflect a 
practice called p-hacking. P-hacking occurs when authors conduct many 
analyses but only report findings that exceed the p value < 0.05 standard. 
Given the great variety in the number of tests reported in our fifty-seven 
studies, the findings reported here might reflect p hacking. Using Uri 
Simonsohn, Leif Nelson, and Joseph Simmons’ tests for p-hacking,102 we 
determined that most of our statistically significant results produce a p value 
< 0.01 and, therefore, they do not meet Simonsohn, et al.’s standards for p-
hacking. Figure 5 displays this information and reports the statistical tests 
rejecting the hypotheses that (1) our studies show no evidentiary power and 
(2) our study’s evidentiary power is inadequate. 
 
 102 Uri Simonsohn, Leif D. Nelson & Joseph P. Simmons, P-Curve: A Key to the File-
Drawer, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 534, 539–44 (2014). 
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B. STUDY DESIGN MODERATORS OF DETERRENT EFFECTS 
Meta-analytic methods provide a basis to test which, if any, design 
characteristics of the available research are associated with stronger or 
weaker deterrent or escalation effects. This research uses all fifty-seven 
“best” effects to produce an analysis of nine moderators. Two moderators—
whether studies were published in peer reviewed journals and whether the 
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studies were published before 2000—provide a test of selection effects of 
peer review and whether findings have changed over time. Six of these 
moderators were selected prior to data collection because of their presumed 
relationship to measuring repeat offending: (1) whether the analysis was 
multivariate or bivariate; (2) whether the analysis is based on the prevalence, 
frequency or time to first new failure; (3) whether the source of recidivism 
data is victim interviews or official records; (4) whether the recidivism is 
measured by a new offense, a new arrest, a new prosecution, or a new 
conviction; (5) whether recidivism involves only violent offenses or any 
offense; and (6) whether offenses against any victim or just the same victim 
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are counted. In response to a suggestion from a reviewer, we created a 0 to 6 
scale based on the standards for methodological rigor used to select the “best” 
tests and grouped each of the fifty-seven studies into three categories—
weaker (less than 2), modest (2 to 4), and stronger (4 or higher)—to assess 
the extent to which overall research quality among the available studies 
moderates the effects of sanctions. 
The findings displayed in Table 4 list the nine potential moderators 
along with the number of tests, the log odds ratio, and the z and p values for 
each category, as well as the results of the Q test for differences between the 
categories for each moderator.103 For instance, the thirty-three peer reviewed 
studies had a log odds ratio of 0.00, but other types of documents had a log 
odds ratio of 0.22. Thus, studies producing an escalation effect are less likely 
found in peer review journals but, based on the Q statistic, these differences 
are not large enough to be statistically significant. Using these same criteria, 
there appears to be no trend in the direction of reported findings before and 
after 2000 or between bivariate and multivariate analyses. Similarly, 
differences in the size of the log odds ratios produced by tests using 
frequency measures (0.67) versus those using prevalence (0.03) or survival 
(0.06) measures are not large enough to meet the Q test for statistically 
significance. Thus, the effects of sanction are not moderated by publication 
type, data collection year, analysis type, or recidivism parameter. 
Based on statistically significant Q tests, sanction effects are moderated 
by five other characteristics: the source of recidivism data, the recidivism 
criteria, the recidivism offense, the type of victim, and the overall quality of 
the research design. When recidivism is measured using victim interviews, 
there is a statistically significant deterrent effect; when measured using 
official records, there is a statistically significant escalation effect. When 
recidivism is based on new offenses, there is a statistically significant 
deterrent effect. When recidivism is based on new arrests or new convictions, 
there is a statistically significant escalation effect. Similarly, when recidivism 
is limited to violent offenses, the effect is essentially zero; when any type of 
offense is used to measure repeat offending, there is a statistically significant 
escalation effect. Analyses based on repeat offending against the same victim 
produce a nonsignificant deterrent effect; when the analyses include any 
victim, there is a statistically significant escalation effect. Lastly, the effect 
of sanctions is moderated by the summary measure of research quality with 
the stronger research designs producing a statistically significant deterrent 
effect and weaker designs generating escalation effects. 
 
 103 See Tania B. Huedo-Medina, Julio Sánchez-Meca, Fulgencio Marín-Martinez & Juan 
Botella, Assessing Heterogeneity in Meta-Analysis: Q Statistic or I² Index?, 11 PSYCH. 
METHODS 193, 199–214 (2006). 
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Tammy Kochel and colleagues’ bivariate tests of thirteen moderators of 
the relationship between race and arrest found no statistically significant 
moderator effects.104 On the other hand, Travis Pratt and his colleagues’ 
multivariate analyses found that deterrent theory effect sizes are “sensitive to 
a host of methodological variations.”105 Our bivariate moderator analyses 
found significant effects for five out of nine moderators; however, these five 
moderators are not independent of each other. The use of victim interviews, 
the offense criteria, and same-victim measures are highly correlated, so the 
independent impact of each one of these effects is uncertain.106 These 
moderator analyses suggest that the methodological weaknesses of existing 
research constrain the ability of that research to accurately detect the extent 
to which alternative criminal sanctions reduce intimate partner violence. 
Three of our fifty-seven studies are derived from Canadian samples. 
Removing the three Canadian studies changed the effect sizes slightly, but in 
no instance did their removal from the analyses change the direction or 
statistical significance of any of the tests of these three hypotheses.107 
IV. DISCUSSION 
While our approach provides a rigorous review of the existing research, 
the methods and measures used in the available research are not always well-
equipped to inform policy or to test theory. When possible, these weaker 
designs should be avoided in future efforts. More specifically, our meta-
analysis identified several areas where investments and enhancements are 
needed to improve our understanding of deterrence theory. The first research 
priority should be to build on the small numbers of existing studies of 
prosecution effects with a few studies large and rigorous enough to resolve 
whether prosecution is or is not associated reduced amounts of intimate 
partner violence. For these studies, analyses of focused policy interventions 
 
 104 Kochel, Wilson & Mastrofski, supra note 100, at 489–90. 
 105 Travis C. Pratt, Francis T. Cullen, Kristie R. Blevins, Leah E. Daigle & Tamara D. 
Madensen, The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, in TAKING STOCK: 
THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367, 384 (Francis T. Cullen, John Paul Wright & 
Kristie R. Blevins eds., 2008). 
 106 See Mark W. Lipsey, Those Confounded Moderators in Meta-Analysis: Good, Bad, 
and Ugly, 587 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 69, 71–78 (2003) (illustrating the hazards 
and complexities of interpreting moderator analyses in meta-analyses). 
 107 These sources were: Peter Jaffe, David A. Wolfe, Anne Telford & Gary Austin, The 
Impact of Police Charges in Incidents of Wife Abuse, 1 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 37 (1986); Lauren 
Marsland, Darryl Plecas & Tim Segger, Reticence and Re-Assault Among Victims of 
Domestic Violence in a Pro-Charge Jurisdiction (Jan. 2001) (unpublished report) (on file with 
J. Crim. L. & Criminology); NATHALIE QUANN, CANADA DEP’T OF JUST., OFFENDER PROFILE 
AND RECIDIVISM AMONG DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS IN ONTARIO (2006). 
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may be sufficient to address this basic question, especially if they can address 
the problem of selecting high-risk offenders for more severe sanctions and 
measure repeat offending using victim interviews as well as official records. 
Even if successful, those prosecution studies cannot explain why 
potential offenders do or do not repeat their offenses. For that more important 
set of questions, future research on sanctions for intimate partner violence 
needs to study the decision-making of potential offenders and incorporate not 
just the characteristics of sanctions but the variety of factors—including 
emotions and fears—that can test alternative theories of the causes of 
intimate partner violence.108 To be especially useful for understanding 
intimate partner violence, such panel studies should interview both partners 
and capture information relevant to other theories of intimate partner 
violence, such as victim empowerment.109 
None of the research included in this meta-analysis adequately 
addressed the extent to which more severe criminal justice sanctions were 
imposed on individuals because they were thought to have a higher likelihood 
of offending again. Some studies of imprisonment have used the random 
assignment of cases to judges or propensity scores to at least partially address 
the long-standing issue of selection bias in criminology;110  however, another 
promising approach is the development of accurate prediction models for 
future incidents of intimate partner violence and the comparison of predicted 
failures and actual failures for individuals arrested, prosecuted, convicted, or 
incarcerated.111 
In the broader field of deterrence research, theorists have yet to identify 
what is the appropriate minimum or maximum time at risk needed to assess 
properly the impact of criminal sanctions on subsequent offending. Our 
understanding of deterrence is insufficient to specify how quickly and for 
how long any particular sanction will or will not affect particular types of 
 
 108 See Greg Pogarsky, Sean Patrick Roche & Justin T. Pickett, Offender Decision-
Making in Criminology: Contributions from Behavioral Economics, 1 ANN. REV. 
CRIMINOLOGY 379, 389–91 (2018). 
 109 See Cattaneo & Goodman, supra note 5, at 84; (arguing for the important place of 
victim emplowerment as active causal agents in reducing intimate partner violence); Mills, 
supra note 62, at 313–16 (emphasizing the role of victims in the understanding the casual 
relationship between criminal justice policies and repeat offending). 
 110 See, e.g., Daniel P. Mears, Joshua C. Cochran, William D. Bales & Avinash S. Bhati, 
Recidivism and Time Served in Prison, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 81, 141–44 (2016) 
(reviewing the use of alternative methodological approaches to test the effects of 
imprisonment on future criminal behavior). 
 111 See generally Kirk R. Williams & Richard Stansfield, Disentangling the Risk 
Assessment and Intimate Partner Violence Relation: Estimating Mediating and Moderating 
Effects, 41 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 344 (2017) (demonstrating how the use of domestic violence 
risk assessments was associated with reduced recidivisim for high risk perpetrators). 
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criminal behavior. Should the specific deterrent effects of criminal sanctions 
last about as long as an aspirin cures a headache, as long as a flu vaccine 
prevents the flu, or as long as the polio vaccine prevents polio? Sanction 
theories needed to address that fundamental question before research can 
properly determine the appropriate time at risk for measuring repeat 
offending. Future research on sanctions for intimate partner violence may 
also benefit from what we learned from our moderator analysis. Although 
best viewed as more descriptive and exploratory than rigorous hypothesis 
testing, our moderator analysis suggests that future research on the deterrent 
effects of intimate partner violence would be stronger if it emphasized 
offense-based frequency measures of violent offending perpetrated against 
the same victim and if those measures of repeat offending were obtained from 
victim interviews. 
This research was motivated by the inattention to intimate partner 
violence and to sanctions other than arrest or imprisonment in existing 
reviews of deterrence research. The findings presented here demonstrate that 
those reviews have ignored a large body of research that reveals real 
differences in the size and direction of the deterrent effects that different 
criminal sanctions have on intimate partner violence. Future research on 
deterrence might benefit from incorporating Durlauf and Nagin’s suggestion 
that deterrent effects might vary by different types of sanctions and for a 
variety of offense types.112 
At the present time, several federal programs promote the use of more 
prosecution, conviction, and incarceration for intimate partner violence. The 
evidence from this research is that there is more—not less—violence against 
intimate partners when prosecution and conviction are followed by 
incarceration. These findings provide systematic evidence against the use of 
incarceration for this offense; however, we appreciate the concerns that no 
one study, even a review of many studies like our meta-analyses, will likely 
produce sufficient knowledge to formulate new policies by itself.113 
Nevertheless, the potential harm associated with incarceration cannot be 
ignored, and those who advocate for more frequent and more severe post-
arrest sanctions must either develop alternatives to incarceration or identify 
other rationales that provide sufficiently large social benefits to outweigh the 
increased frequency of violence associated with the use of incarceration for 
intimate partner violence. 
 
 112 Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 37, at 85–86. 
 113 Robert J. Sampson, Christopher Winship & Carly Knight, Translating Causal Claims: 
Principles and Strategies for Policy-Relevant Criminology, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
587, 594–96 (2013). 
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V. APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Keyword and Search Terms for Meta-Analysis 
  
Intimate Partner Violence  Court Disposition  Recidivism 
Domestic abuse   Charge   Deterrence  
Domestic assault   Conviction   Reabuse 
Domestic violence   Court    Rearrest 
Family violence   Counseling   Reassault 
Intimate partner violence  Criminal justice system Recharge 
Intimate partner abuse  Disposition   Recidivism 
Intimate terrorism   Jail   Reconviction 
Spousal abuse   Incarceration  Reoffense 
Spousal violence   Legal Intervention  Repeat abuse 
Wife assault   Legal system  Repeat offense 
Wife abuse   Prison   Revictimization 
Wife batter    Probation  
Violence against intimate partner Prosecution  
Violence against spousal  Sanction  
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